HALF ECHO LEARN / REFERENCE COLLECTION
v262.2src/creds/creds.c
Git blob: 740a0321e661f6b5dbae2aca047746351ba635fd
Lines 1001–1458 of 1,458
else if (sd_id128_in_set(arg_with_key, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_SCOPED))
arg_with_key = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_SCOPED;
else if (sd_id128_in_set(arg_with_key, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK_SCOPED))
arg_with_key = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK_SCOPED;
else if (sd_id128_in_set(arg_with_key, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_PINNED_SRK, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_SCOPED_PINNED_SRK))
arg_with_key = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_SCOPED_PINNED_SRK;
else if (sd_id128_in_set(arg_with_key, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK_PINNED_SRK, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK_SCOPED_PINNED_SRK))
arg_with_key = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK_SCOPED_PINNED_SRK;
else
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Selected key not available in --uid= scoped mode, refusing.");
}
if (arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX)
arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = 0;
if (arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX)
arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = UINT32_C(1) << TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_BOOT;
r = sd_varlink_invocation(SD_VARLINK_ALLOW_ACCEPT);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to check if invoked in Varlink mode: %m");
arg_varlink = r;
*ret_args = option_parser_get_args(&opts);
return 1;
}
#define TIMESTAMP_FRESH_MAX (30*USEC_PER_SEC)
static bool timestamp_is_fresh(usec_t x) {
usec_t n = now(CLOCK_REALTIME);
/* We'll only allow unprivileged encryption/decryption for somehwhat "fresh" timestamps */
if (x > n)
return x - n <= TIMESTAMP_FRESH_MAX;
else
return n - x <= TIMESTAMP_FRESH_MAX;
}
typedef enum CredentialScope {
CREDENTIAL_SYSTEM,
CREDENTIAL_USER,
/* One day we should add more here, for example, per-app/per-service credentials */
_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_MAX,
_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} CredentialScope;
static const char* credential_scope_table[_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_MAX] = {
[CREDENTIAL_SYSTEM] = "system",
[CREDENTIAL_USER] = "user",
};
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_FROM_STRING(credential_scope, CredentialScope);
static JSON_DISPATCH_ENUM_DEFINE(dispatch_credential_scope, CredentialScope, credential_scope_from_string);
typedef struct MethodEncryptParameters {
const char *name;
const char *text;
struct iovec data;
uint64_t timestamp;
uint64_t not_after;
CredentialScope scope;
sd_id128_t with_key;
uid_t uid;
} MethodEncryptParameters;
static void method_encrypt_parameters_done(MethodEncryptParameters *p) {
assert(p);
iovec_done_erase(&p->data);
}
static int settle_scope(
sd_varlink *link,
CredentialScope *scope,
uid_t *uid,
CredentialFlags *flags,
bool *any_scope_after_polkit) {
uid_t peer_uid;
int r;
assert(link);
assert(scope);
assert(uid);
assert(flags);
r = sd_varlink_get_peer_uid(link, &peer_uid);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (*scope < 0) {
if (uid_is_valid(*uid))
*scope = CREDENTIAL_USER;
else {
*scope = CREDENTIAL_SYSTEM; /* When encrypting, we spit out a system credential */
*uid = peer_uid; /* When decrypting a user credential, use this UID */
}
if (peer_uid == 0)
*flags |= CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE;
if (any_scope_after_polkit)
*any_scope_after_polkit = true;
} else if (*scope == CREDENTIAL_USER) {
if (!uid_is_valid(*uid))
*uid = peer_uid;
} else {
assert(*scope == CREDENTIAL_SYSTEM);
if (uid_is_valid(*uid))
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "uid");
}
return 0;
}
static char normalize_separator(char c) {
if (IN_SET(c, '-', '+', '_'))
return '_';
return c;
}
static bool enum_name_equal(const char *x, const char *y) {
if (x == y)
return true;
if (!x || !y)
return false;
for (;; x++, y++) {
char a = normalize_separator(*x), b = normalize_separator(*y);
if (a != b)
return false;
if (a == 0)
return true;
}
}
static CredKeyType cred_key_type_from_string_harder(const char *s) {
if (!s)
return _CRED_KEY_TYPE_INVALID;
CredKeyType t = cred_key_type_from_string(s);
if (t >= 0)
return t;
/* Varlink doesn't like dashes and plusses in enum names. Try to match when considering them equal to underscores */
for (t = 0; t < _CRED_KEY_TYPE_MAX; t++)
if (enum_name_equal(cred_key_type_table[t], s))
return t;
return _CRED_KEY_TYPE_INVALID;
}
static int dispatch_credential_key_type(
const char *name,
sd_json_variant *variant,
sd_json_dispatch_flags_t flags,
void *userdata) {
sd_id128_t *id = ASSERT_PTR(userdata);
if (sd_json_variant_is_null(variant)) {
*id = SD_ID128_NULL;
return 0;
}
const char *s = sd_json_variant_string(variant);
if (isempty(s)) {
*id = SD_ID128_NULL;
return 0;
}
CredKeyType t = cred_key_type_from_string_harder(s);
if (t < 0)
return json_log(variant, flags, t, "JSON field '%s' is not a valid key type.", strna(name));
*id = cred_key_id[t];
return 0;
}
static int vl_method_encrypt(sd_varlink *link, sd_json_variant *parameters, sd_varlink_method_flags_t flags, void *userdata) {
static const sd_json_dispatch_field dispatch_table[] = {
{ "name", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, sd_json_dispatch_const_string, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, name), 0 },
{ "text", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, sd_json_dispatch_const_string, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, text), 0 },
{ "data", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_unbase64_iovec, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, data), 0 },
{ "timestamp", _SD_JSON_VARIANT_TYPE_INVALID, sd_json_dispatch_uint64, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, timestamp), 0 },
{ "notAfter", _SD_JSON_VARIANT_TYPE_INVALID, sd_json_dispatch_uint64, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, not_after), 0 },
{ "scope", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, dispatch_credential_scope, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, scope), 0 },
{ "withKey", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, dispatch_credential_key_type, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, with_key), SD_JSON_NULLABLE },
{ "uid", _SD_JSON_VARIANT_TYPE_INVALID, sd_json_dispatch_uid_gid, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, uid), 0 },
VARLINK_DISPATCH_POLKIT_FIELD,
{}
};
_cleanup_(method_encrypt_parameters_done) MethodEncryptParameters p = {
.timestamp = UINT64_MAX,
.not_after = UINT64_MAX,
.scope = _CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_INVALID,
.uid = UID_INVALID,
};
_cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec output = {};
Hashmap **polkit_registry = ASSERT_PTR(userdata);
CredentialFlags cflags = 0;
bool timestamp_fresh;
uid_t peer_uid;
int r;
assert(link);
r = sd_varlink_dispatch(link, parameters, dispatch_table, &p);
if (r != 0)
return r;
if (p.name && !credential_name_valid(p.name))
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "name");
/* Specifying both or neither the text string and the binary data is not allowed */
if (!!p.text == !!p.data.iov_base)
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "data");
if (p.timestamp == UINT64_MAX) {
p.timestamp = now(CLOCK_REALTIME);
timestamp_fresh = true;
} else
timestamp_fresh = timestamp_is_fresh(p.timestamp);
if (p.not_after != UINT64_MAX && p.not_after <= p.timestamp)
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "notAfter");
r = settle_scope(link, &p.scope, &p.uid, &cflags, /* any_scope_after_polkit= */ NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = sd_varlink_get_peer_uid(link, &peer_uid);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Relax security requirements if peer wants to encrypt credentials for themselves */
bool own_scope = p.scope == CREDENTIAL_USER && p.uid == peer_uid;
if (!own_scope || !timestamp_fresh) {
/* Insist on PK if client wants to encrypt for another user or the system, or if the timestamp was explicitly overridden. */
r = varlink_verify_polkit_async(
link,
/* bus= */ NULL,
"io.systemd.credentials.encrypt",
/* details= */ NULL,
polkit_registry);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
}
r = encrypt_credential_and_warn(
sd_id128_is_null(p.with_key) ? (p.scope == CREDENTIAL_USER ? _CRED_AUTO_SCOPED : _CRED_AUTO) : p.with_key,
p.name,
p.timestamp,
p.not_after,
arg_tpm2_device,
arg_tpm2_pcr_mask,
arg_tpm2_public_key,
arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask,
p.uid,
p.text ? &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(p.text) : &p.data,
cflags,
&output);
if (r == -ESRCH)
return sd_varlink_error(link, "io.systemd.Credentials.NoSuchUser", NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *reply = NULL;
r = sd_json_buildo(&reply, JSON_BUILD_PAIR_IOVEC_BASE64("blob", &output));
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Let's also mark the (theoretically encrypted) reply as sensitive, in case the NULL encryption scheme was used. */
sd_json_variant_sensitive(reply);
return sd_varlink_reply(link, reply);
}
typedef struct MethodDecryptParameters {
const char *name;
struct iovec blob;
uint64_t timestamp;
CredentialScope scope;
uid_t uid;
int allow_null;
} MethodDecryptParameters;
static void method_decrypt_parameters_done(MethodDecryptParameters *p) {
assert(p);
iovec_done_erase(&p->blob);
}
static int vl_method_decrypt(sd_varlink *link, sd_json_variant *parameters, sd_varlink_method_flags_t flags, void *userdata) {
static const sd_json_dispatch_field dispatch_table[] = {
{ "name", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, sd_json_dispatch_const_string, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, name), 0 },
{ "blob", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_unbase64_iovec, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, blob), SD_JSON_MANDATORY },
{ "timestamp", _SD_JSON_VARIANT_TYPE_INVALID, sd_json_dispatch_uint64, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, timestamp), 0 },
{ "scope", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, dispatch_credential_scope, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, scope), 0 },
{ "uid", _SD_JSON_VARIANT_TYPE_INVALID, sd_json_dispatch_uid_gid, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, uid), 0 },
{ "allowNull", SD_JSON_VARIANT_BOOLEAN, sd_json_dispatch_tristate, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, allow_null), SD_JSON_NULLABLE },
VARLINK_DISPATCH_POLKIT_FIELD,
{}
};
_cleanup_(method_decrypt_parameters_done) MethodDecryptParameters p = {
.timestamp = UINT64_MAX,
.scope = _CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_INVALID,
.uid = UID_INVALID,
.allow_null = -1,
};
bool timestamp_fresh, any_scope_after_polkit = false;
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec output = {};
Hashmap **polkit_registry = ASSERT_PTR(userdata);
CredentialFlags cflags = 0;
uid_t peer_uid;
int r;
assert(link);
r = sd_varlink_dispatch(link, parameters, dispatch_table, &p);
if (r != 0)
return r;
if (p.name && !credential_name_valid(p.name))
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "name");
if (p.timestamp == UINT64_MAX) {
p.timestamp = now(CLOCK_REALTIME);
timestamp_fresh = true;
} else
timestamp_fresh = timestamp_is_fresh(p.timestamp);
r = settle_scope(link, &p.scope, &p.uid, &cflags, &any_scope_after_polkit);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (p.allow_null > 0)
cflags |= CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL;
else if (p.allow_null == 0)
cflags |= CREDENTIAL_REFUSE_NULL;
r = sd_varlink_get_peer_uid(link, &peer_uid);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Relax security requirements if peer wants to encrypt credentials for themselves */
bool own_scope = p.scope == CREDENTIAL_USER && p.uid == peer_uid;
bool ask_polkit = !own_scope || !timestamp_fresh;
for (;;) {
if (ask_polkit) {
r = varlink_verify_polkit_async(
link,
/* bus= */ NULL,
"io.systemd.credentials.decrypt",
/* details= */ NULL,
polkit_registry);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
/* Now that we have authenticated, it's fine to allow unpriv clients access to system secrets */
if (any_scope_after_polkit)
cflags |= CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE;
}
r = decrypt_credential_and_warn(
p.name,
p.timestamp,
arg_tpm2_device,
arg_tpm2_signature,
p.uid,
&p.blob,
cflags,
&output);
if (r != -EMEDIUMTYPE || ask_polkit || !any_scope_after_polkit)
break;
/* So the secret was apparently intended for the system. Let's retry decrypting it after
* acquiring polkit's permission. */
ask_polkit = true;
}
if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_TPM2_UNSEAL_BAD_PCR(r))
return sd_varlink_error(link, "io.systemd.Credentials.UnexpectedPCRState", NULL);
if (r < 0) {
const CredentialsVarlinkError *e = credentials_varlink_error_by_errno(r);
if (e)
return sd_varlink_error(link, e->id, NULL);
return r;
}
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *reply = NULL;
r = sd_json_buildo(&reply, JSON_BUILD_PAIR_IOVEC_BASE64("data", &output));
if (r < 0)
return r;
sd_json_variant_sensitive(reply);
return sd_varlink_reply(link, reply);
}
static int vl_server(void) {
_cleanup_(sd_varlink_server_unrefp) sd_varlink_server *varlink_server = NULL;
_cleanup_hashmap_free_ Hashmap *polkit_registry = NULL;
int r;
/* Invocation as Varlink service */
r = varlink_server_new(
&varlink_server,
SD_VARLINK_SERVER_ACCOUNT_UID|SD_VARLINK_SERVER_INHERIT_USERDATA|SD_VARLINK_SERVER_INPUT_SENSITIVE,
&polkit_registry);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate Varlink server: %m");
r = sd_varlink_server_add_interface(varlink_server, &vl_interface_io_systemd_Credentials);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add Varlink interface: %m");
r = sd_varlink_server_bind_method_many(
varlink_server,
"io.systemd.Credentials.Encrypt", vl_method_encrypt,
"io.systemd.Credentials.Decrypt", vl_method_decrypt);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to bind Varlink methods: %m");
r = sd_varlink_server_loop_auto(varlink_server);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run Varlink event loop: %m");
return 0;
}
static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
int r;
LIBCRYPTO_NOTE(suggested);
LIBMOUNT_NOTE(recommended);
TPM2_NOTE(suggested);
log_setup();
char **args = NULL;
r = parse_argv(argc, argv, &args);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
if (arg_varlink)
return vl_server();
return dispatch_verb(args, NULL);
}
DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION_WITH_POSITIVE_FAILURE(run);