HALF ECHO LEARN / REFERENCE COLLECTION
v262.2src/mountfsd/mountwork.c
Git blob: af84ace1eb903aee404f00dddc3adbc49cfbc80e
Lines 1–1000 of 1,611
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include <linux/loop.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "sd-daemon.h"
#include "sd-event.h"
#include "sd-varlink.h"
#include "argv-util.h"
#include "bus-polkit.h"
#include "chase.h"
#include "discover-image.h"
#include "dissect-image.h"
#include "dlopen-note.h"
#include "env-util.h"
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "fs-util.h"
#include "format-util.h"
#include "hashmap.h"
#include "image-policy.h"
#include "io-util.h"
#include "iovec-util.h"
#include "json-util.h"
#include "loop-util.h"
#include "main-func.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
#include "mount-util.h"
#include "namespace-util.h"
#include "nsresource.h"
#include "nulstr-util.h"
#include "os-util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "pidref.h"
#include "process-util.h"
#include "socket-util.h"
#include "stat-util.h"
#include "string-table.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
#include "tmpfile-util.h"
#include "time-util.h"
#include "uid-classification.h"
#include "uid-range.h"
#include "user-util.h"
#include "varlink-io.systemd.MountFileSystem.h"
#include "varlink-util.h"
#define ITERATIONS_MAX 64U
#define RUNTIME_MAX_USEC (5 * USEC_PER_MINUTE)
#define PRESSURE_SLEEP_TIME_USEC (50 * USEC_PER_MSEC)
#define LISTEN_IDLE_USEC (90 * USEC_PER_SEC)
static const ImagePolicy image_policy_untrusted = {
.n_policies = 2,
.policies = {
{ PARTITION_ROOT, PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_USR, PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
},
.default_flags = PARTITION_POLICY_IGNORE,
};
static int json_dispatch_image_options(const char *name, sd_json_variant *variant, sd_json_dispatch_flags_t flags, void *userdata) {
_cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL;
MountOptions **p = ASSERT_PTR(userdata);
int r;
if (sd_json_variant_is_null(variant)) {
*p = mount_options_free_all(*p);
return 0;
}
if (!sd_json_variant_is_object(variant))
return json_log(variant, flags, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "JSON field '%s' is not an object.", strna(name));
const char *k;
sd_json_variant *e;
JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT_FOREACH(k, e, variant) {
PartitionDesignator pd = partition_designator_from_string(k);
if (pd < 0)
return json_log(variant, flags, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid partition designator '%s'.", strna(k));
if (!sd_json_variant_is_string(e))
return json_log(e, flags, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Mount option for partition '%s' is not a string.", strna(k));
if (!options) {
options = new0(MountOptions, 1);
if (!options)
return json_log_oom(variant, flags);
}
r = free_and_strdup(&options->options[pd], sd_json_variant_string(e));
if (r < 0)
return json_log_oom(variant, flags);
}
mount_options_free_all(*p);
*p = TAKE_PTR(options);
return 0;
}
static int json_dispatch_image_policy(const char *name, sd_json_variant *variant, sd_json_dispatch_flags_t flags, void *userdata) {
_cleanup_(image_policy_freep) ImagePolicy *q = NULL;
ImagePolicy **p = ASSERT_PTR(userdata);
int r;
assert(p);
if (sd_json_variant_is_null(variant)) {
*p = image_policy_free(*p);
return 0;
}
if (!sd_json_variant_is_string(variant))
return json_log(variant, flags, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "JSON field '%s' is not a string.", strna(name));
r = image_policy_from_string(sd_json_variant_string(variant), /* graceful= */ false, &q);
if (r < 0)
return json_log(variant, flags, r, "JSON field '%s' is not a valid image policy.", strna(name));
image_policy_free(*p);
*p = TAKE_PTR(q);
return 0;
}
typedef struct MountImageParameters {
unsigned image_fd_idx;
unsigned userns_fd_idx;
int read_only;
int growfs;
char *password;
ImagePolicy *image_policy;
MountOptions *options;
bool relax_extension_release_check;
bool verity_sharing;
struct iovec verity_root_hash;
struct iovec verity_root_hash_sig;
unsigned verity_data_fd_idx;
} MountImageParameters;
static void mount_image_parameters_done(MountImageParameters *p) {
assert(p);
p->password = erase_and_free(p->password);
p->image_policy = image_policy_free(p->image_policy);
iovec_done(&p->verity_root_hash);
iovec_done(&p->verity_root_hash_sig);
p->options = mount_options_free_all(p->options);
}
static int validate_image_fd(int fd, MountImageParameters *p) {
int r, fl;
assert(fd >= 0);
assert(p);
/* Only support regular files and block devices. */
r = fd_verify_regular_or_block(fd);
if (r < 0)
return r;
fl = fd_verify_safe_flags_full(fd, O_NONBLOCK);
if (fl < 0)
return log_debug_errno(fl, "Image file descriptor has unsafe flags set: %m");
switch (fl & O_ACCMODE_STRICT) {
case O_RDONLY:
p->read_only = true;
break;
case O_RDWR:
break;
default:
return -EBADF;
}
return 0;
}
static int verify_trusted_image_fd_by_path(int fd) {
int r;
assert(fd >= 0);
r = secure_getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_MOUNTFSD_TRUSTED_DIRECTORIES");
if (r == -ENXIO) {
if (!DEFAULT_MOUNTFSD_TRUSTED_DIRECTORIES) {
log_debug("Trusted directory mechanism disabled at compile time.");
return false;
}
} else if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_MOUNTFSD_TRUSTED_DIRECTORIES environment variable, not trusting any image.");
return false;
} else if (!r) {
log_debug("Trusted directory mechanism disabled via $SYSTEMD_MOUNTFSD_TRUSTED_DIRECTORIES environment variable.");
return false;
}
_cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
r = fd_get_path(fd, &p);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to get path of passed image file descriptor: %m");
struct stat sta;
if (fstat(fd, &sta) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() passed image file descriptor: %m");
if (!S_ISREG(sta.st_mode)) {
log_debug("Image '%s' is not a regular file, hence skipping trusted directory check.", p);
return false;
}
log_debug("Checking if image '%s' is in trusted directories.", p);
for (ImageClass c = 0; c < _IMAGE_CLASS_MAX; c++)
NULSTR_FOREACH(s, image_search_path[c]) {
_cleanup_close_ int dir_fd = -EBADF, inode_fd = -EBADF;
_cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL;
struct stat stb;
const char *e;
r = chase(s, NULL, CHASE_SAFE|CHASE_TRIGGER_AUTOFS, &q, &dir_fd);
if (r == -ENOENT)
continue;
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to resolve search path '%s', ignoring: %m", s);
continue;
}
/* Check that the inode refers to a file immediately inside the image directory,
* i.e. not the image directory itself, and nothing further down the tree */
e = path_startswith(p, q);
if (isempty(e))
continue;
e += strspn(e, "/");
if (!filename_is_valid(e))
continue;
r = chaseat(XAT_FDROOT, dir_fd, e, CHASE_SAFE|CHASE_TRIGGER_AUTOFS, NULL, &inode_fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Couldn't verify that specified image '%s' is in search path '%s': %m", p, s);
if (fstat(inode_fd, &stb) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to stat image file '%s/%s': %m", q, e);
if (stat_inode_same(&sta, &stb)) {
log_debug("Image '%s' is *in* trusted directories.", p);
return true; /* Yay */
}
}
log_debug("Image '%s' is *not* in trusted directories.", p);
return false;
}
static int determine_image_policy(
int image_fd,
bool trusted,
ImagePolicy *client_policy,
ImagePolicy **ret) {
_cleanup_(image_policy_freep) ImagePolicy *envvar_policy = NULL;
const ImagePolicy *default_policy;
const char *envvar, *e;
int r;
assert(image_fd >= 0);
assert(ret);
if (trusted) {
envvar = "SYSTEMD_MOUNTFSD_IMAGE_POLICY_TRUSTED";
default_policy = &image_policy_allow;
} else {
envvar = "SYSTEMD_MOUNTFSD_IMAGE_POLICY_UNTRUSTED";
default_policy = &image_policy_untrusted;
}
e = secure_getenv(envvar);
if (e) {
r = image_policy_from_string(e, /* graceful= */ false, &envvar_policy);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse image policy supplied via $%s: %m", envvar);
default_policy = envvar_policy;
}
return image_policy_intersect(default_policy, client_policy, ret);
}
static int validate_userns(sd_varlink *link, int *userns_fd) {
int r;
assert(link);
assert(userns_fd);
if (*userns_fd < 0)
return 0;
r = fd_verify_safe_flags(*userns_fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "User namespace file descriptor has unsafe flags set: %m");
r = fd_is_namespace(*userns_fd, NAMESPACE_USER);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "userNamespaceFileDescriptor");
/* Our own host user namespace? Then close the fd, and handle it as if none was specified. */
r = is_our_namespace(*userns_fd, NAMESPACE_USER);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine if user namespace provided by client is our own.");
if (r > 0) {
log_debug("User namespace provided by client is our own.");
*userns_fd = safe_close(*userns_fd);
}
return 0;
}
static int mount_options_to_polkit_details(const MountOptions *options, char **ret_mount_options_concat) {
_cleanup_free_ char *mount_options_concat = NULL;
int r;
assert(ret_mount_options_concat);
if (!options) {
*ret_mount_options_concat = NULL;
return 0;
}
for (PartitionDesignator i = 0; i < _PARTITION_DESIGNATOR_MAX; i++) {
_cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL;
if (isempty(options->options[i]))
continue;
escaped = shell_escape(options->options[i], ":");
if (!escaped)
return log_oom_debug();
r = strextendf_with_separator(
&mount_options_concat,
",",
"%s:%s",
partition_designator_to_string(i),
escaped);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
*ret_mount_options_concat = TAKE_PTR(mount_options_concat);
return 0;
}
static int vl_method_mount_image(
sd_varlink *link,
sd_json_variant *parameters,
sd_varlink_method_flags_t flags,
void *userdata) {
static const sd_json_dispatch_field dispatch_table[] = {
{ "imageFileDescriptor", SD_JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, sd_json_dispatch_uint, offsetof(MountImageParameters, image_fd_idx), SD_JSON_MANDATORY },
{ "userNamespaceFileDescriptor", SD_JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, sd_json_dispatch_uint, offsetof(MountImageParameters, userns_fd_idx), 0 },
{ "readOnly", SD_JSON_VARIANT_BOOLEAN, sd_json_dispatch_tristate, offsetof(MountImageParameters, read_only), 0 },
{ "growFileSystems", SD_JSON_VARIANT_BOOLEAN, sd_json_dispatch_tristate, offsetof(MountImageParameters, growfs), 0 },
{ "password", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, sd_json_dispatch_string, offsetof(MountImageParameters, password), 0 },
{ "imagePolicy", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_image_policy, offsetof(MountImageParameters, image_policy), 0 },
{ "mountOptions", SD_JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, json_dispatch_image_options, offsetof(MountImageParameters, options), 0 },
{ "relaxExtensionReleaseChecks", SD_JSON_VARIANT_BOOLEAN, sd_json_dispatch_stdbool, offsetof(MountImageParameters, relax_extension_release_check), 0 },
{ "veritySharing", SD_JSON_VARIANT_BOOLEAN, sd_json_dispatch_stdbool, offsetof(MountImageParameters, verity_sharing), 0 },
{ "verityDataFileDescriptor", SD_JSON_VARIANT_UNSIGNED, sd_json_dispatch_uint, offsetof(MountImageParameters, verity_data_fd_idx), 0 },
{ "verityRootHash", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_unhex_iovec, offsetof(MountImageParameters, verity_root_hash), 0 },
{ "verityRootHashSignature", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_unbase64_iovec, offsetof(MountImageParameters, verity_root_hash_sig), 0 },
VARLINK_DISPATCH_POLKIT_FIELD,
{}
};
_cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT;
_cleanup_(mount_image_parameters_done) MountImageParameters p = {
.image_fd_idx = UINT_MAX,
.userns_fd_idx = UINT_MAX,
.verity_data_fd_idx = UINT_MAX,
.read_only = -1,
.growfs = -1,
};
_cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *di = NULL;
_cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop = NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *aj = NULL;
_cleanup_close_ int image_fd = -EBADF, userns_fd = -EBADF, verity_data_fd = -EBADF;
_cleanup_(image_policy_freep) ImagePolicy *use_policy = NULL;
Hashmap **polkit_registry = ASSERT_PTR(userdata);
_cleanup_free_ char *ps = NULL;
bool image_is_trusted = false;
int r;
assert(link);
assert(parameters);
sd_json_variant_sensitive(parameters); /* might contain passwords */
r = sd_varlink_dispatch(link, parameters, dispatch_table, &p);
if (r != 0)
return r;
/* Verity data and roothash have to be either both set, or both unset. The sig can be set only if
* the roothash is set. */
if ((p.verity_data_fd_idx != UINT_MAX) != (p.verity_root_hash.iov_len > 0))
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "verityDataFileDescriptor");
if (p.verity_root_hash_sig.iov_len > 0 && p.verity_root_hash.iov_len == 0)
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "verityRootHashSignature");
if (p.image_fd_idx != UINT_MAX) {
image_fd = sd_varlink_peek_dup_fd(link, p.image_fd_idx);
if (image_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(image_fd, "Failed to peek image fd from client: %m");
}
if (p.userns_fd_idx != UINT_MAX) {
userns_fd = sd_varlink_peek_dup_fd(link, p.userns_fd_idx);
if (userns_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(userns_fd, "Failed to peek user namespace fd from client: %m");
}
r = validate_image_fd(image_fd, &p);
if (r == -EREMOTEIO)
return sd_varlink_errorbo(link, "io.systemd.MountFileSystem.BadFileDescriptorFlags", SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("parameter", "imageFileDescriptor"));
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = validate_userns(link, &userns_fd);
if (r != 0)
return r;
/* Mount options could be used to thwart security measures such as ACLs or SELinux so if they are
* specified don't mark the image as trusted so that it requires additional privileges to use. */
if (!p.options) {
r = verify_trusted_image_fd_by_path(image_fd);
if (r < 0)
return r;
image_is_trusted = r;
}
if (p.verity_data_fd_idx != UINT_MAX) {
verity_data_fd = sd_varlink_peek_dup_fd(link, p.verity_data_fd_idx);
if (verity_data_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(verity_data_fd, "Failed to peek verity data fd from client: %m");
r = fd_verify_safe_flags(verity_data_fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Verity data file descriptor has unsafe flags set: %m");
verity.data_path = strdup(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(verity_data_fd));
if (!verity.data_path)
return -ENOMEM;
verity.designator = PARTITION_ROOT;
verity.root_hash = TAKE_STRUCT(p.verity_root_hash);
verity.root_hash_sig = TAKE_STRUCT(p.verity_root_hash_sig);
}
/* Let the polkit rule know what mount options the caller tries to use, so that rules can decide
* whether to allow or deny the operation based on what the options are. */
_cleanup_free_ char *mount_options_concat = NULL;
r = mount_options_to_polkit_details(p.options, &mount_options_concat);
if (r < 0)
return r;
const char *polkit_details[] = {
"read_only", one_zero(p.read_only > 0),
!isempty(mount_options_concat) ? "mount_options" : NULL, mount_options_concat,
NULL,
};
const char *polkit_action, *polkit_untrusted_action;
PolkitFlags polkit_flags;
if (userns_fd < 0) {
/* Mount into the host user namespace */
polkit_action = "io.systemd.mount-file-system.mount-image";
polkit_untrusted_action = "io.systemd.mount-file-system.mount-untrusted-image";
polkit_flags = 0;
} else {
/* Mount into a private user namespace */
polkit_action = "io.systemd.mount-file-system.mount-image-privately";
polkit_untrusted_action = "io.systemd.mount-file-system.mount-untrusted-image-privately";
/* If polkit is not around, let's allow mounting authenticated images by default */
polkit_flags = POLKIT_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
}
/* Let's definitely acquire the regular action privilege, for mounting properly signed images */
r = varlink_verify_polkit_async_full(
link,
/* bus= */ NULL,
p.options ? polkit_untrusted_action : polkit_action, /* Using mount options requires higher privs */
polkit_details,
/* good_user= */ UID_INVALID,
polkit_flags,
polkit_registry,
/* ret_admin= */ NULL);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
/* Generate the common dissection directory here. We are not going to use it, but the clients might,
* and they likely are unprivileged, hence cannot create it themselves. Hence let's just create it
* here, if it is missing. */
r = get_common_dissect_directory(NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = loop_device_make(
image_fd,
p.read_only > 0 ? O_RDONLY : -1,
0,
UINT64_MAX,
UINT32_MAX,
LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
LOCK_EX,
&loop);
if (r < 0)
return r;
DissectImageFlags dissect_flags =
(p.read_only > 0 ? DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY : 0) |
(p.growfs != 0 ? DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS : 0) |
DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ANY |
DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK |
DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES |
DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES |
(p.verity_sharing ? DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE : 0) |
/* Maybe the image is a bare filesystem. Note that this requires privileges, as it is
* classified by the policy as an 'unprotected' image and will be refused otherwise. */
DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE |
DISSECT_IMAGE_ALLOW_USERSPACE_VERITY |
(p.relax_extension_release_check ? DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_EXTENSION_CHECK : 0);
/* Let's see if we have acquired the privilege to mount untrusted images already */
bool polkit_have_untrusted_action =
varlink_has_polkit_action(link, polkit_untrusted_action, polkit_details, polkit_registry, /* ret_admin= */ NULL);
for (;;) {
use_policy = image_policy_free(use_policy);
ps = mfree(ps);
/* We use the image policy for trusted images if either the path is below a trusted
* directory, or if we have already acquired a PK authentication that tells us that untrusted
* images are OK */
bool use_trusted_policy =
image_is_trusted ||
polkit_have_untrusted_action;
r = determine_image_policy(
image_fd,
use_trusted_policy,
p.image_policy,
&use_policy);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = image_policy_to_string(use_policy, /* simplify= */ true, &ps);
if (r < 0)
return r;
log_debug("Using image policy: %s", ps);
r = dissect_loop_device(
loop,
&verity,
p.options,
use_policy,
/* image_filter= */ NULL,
dissect_flags,
&di);
if (r == -ENOPKG)
return sd_varlink_error(link, "io.systemd.MountFileSystem.IncompatibleImage", NULL);
if (r == -ENOTUNIQ)
return sd_varlink_error(link, "io.systemd.MountFileSystem.MultipleRootPartitionsFound", NULL);
if (r == -ENXIO)
return sd_varlink_error(link, "io.systemd.MountFileSystem.RootPartitionNotFound", NULL);
if (r == -ERFKILL) {
/* The image policy refused this, let's retry after trying to get PolicyKit */
if (!polkit_have_untrusted_action) {
log_debug("Denied by image policy. Trying a stronger polkit authentication before continuing.");
r = varlink_verify_polkit_async_full(
link,
/* bus= */ NULL,
polkit_untrusted_action,
polkit_details,
/* good_user= */ UID_INVALID,
/* flags= */ 0, /* NB: the image cannot be authenticated, hence unless PK is around to allow this anyway, fail! */
polkit_registry,
/* ret_admin= */ NULL);
if (r <= 0 && !ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r))
return r;
if (r > 0) {
/* Try again, now that we know the client has enough privileges. */
log_debug("Denied by image policy, retrying after polkit authentication.");
polkit_have_untrusted_action = true;
continue;
}
}
return sd_varlink_error(link, "io.systemd.MountFileSystem.DeniedByImagePolicy", NULL);
}
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Success */
break;
}
r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
di,
loop->fd,
&verity);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = dissected_image_guess_verity_roothash(
di,
&verity);
if (r < 0)
return r;
for (;;) {
use_policy = image_policy_free(use_policy);
ps = mfree(ps);
/* We use the image policy for trusted images if either the path is below a trusted
* directory, or if we have already acquired a PK authentication that tells us that untrusted
* images are OK */
bool use_trusted_policy =
image_is_trusted ||
polkit_have_untrusted_action;
r = determine_image_policy(
image_fd,
use_trusted_policy,
p.image_policy,
&use_policy);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = image_policy_to_string(use_policy, /* simplify= */ true, &ps);
if (r < 0)
return r;
log_debug("Using image policy: %s", ps);
r = dissected_image_decrypt(
di,
/* root= */ NULL,
p.password,
&verity,
use_policy,
dissect_flags);
if (r == -EDESTADDRREQ) {
/* new dm-verity userspace returns ENOKEY if the dm-verity signature key is not in
* key chain which we mangle to EDESTADDRREQ. That's great. */
if (!polkit_have_untrusted_action) {
log_debug("Missing verity key in kernel and userspace. Trying a stronger polkit authentication before continuing.");
r = varlink_verify_polkit_async_full(
link,
/* bus= */ NULL,
polkit_untrusted_action,
polkit_details,
/* good_user= */ UID_INVALID,
/* flags= */ 0, /* NB: the image cannot be authenticated, hence unless PK is around to allow this anyway, fail! */
polkit_registry,
/* ret_admin= */ NULL);
if (r <= 0 && !ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r))
return r;
if (r > 0) {
/* Try again, now that we know the client has enough privileges. */
log_debug("Missing verity key in kernel and userspace, retrying after polkit authentication.");
polkit_have_untrusted_action = true;
continue;
}
}
return sd_varlink_error(link, "io.systemd.MountFileSystem.KeyNotFound", NULL);
}
if (r == -EBUSY) /* DM kernel subsystem is bad at returning useful errors hence we keep retrying
* under the assumption that some errors are transitional. Which the errors might
* not actually be. After all retries failed we return EBUSY. Let's turn that into a
* generic Verity error. It's not very helpful, could mean anything, but at least it
* gives client a clear idea that this has to do with Verity. */
return sd_varlink_error(link, "io.systemd.MountFileSystem.VerityFailure", NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Success */
break;
}
r = dissected_image_mount(
di,
/* where= */ NULL,
/* uid_shift= */ UID_INVALID,
/* uid_range= */ UID_INVALID,
userns_fd,
dissect_flags);
if (r < 0)
return r;
_cleanup_(sd_varlink_unrefp) sd_varlink *nsresource_link = NULL;
for (PartitionDesignator d = 0; d < _PARTITION_DESIGNATOR_MAX; d++) {
DissectedPartition *pp = di->partitions + d;
int fd_idx;
if (!pp->found)
continue;
if (pp->fsmount_fd < 0)
continue;
if (userns_fd >= 0) {
if (!nsresource_link) {
r = nsresource_connect(&nsresource_link);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
r = nsresource_add_mount(nsresource_link, userns_fd, pp->fsmount_fd);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
fd_idx = sd_varlink_push_fd(link, pp->fsmount_fd);
if (fd_idx < 0)
return fd_idx;
TAKE_FD(pp->fsmount_fd);
const char *m = partition_mountpoint_to_string(d);
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
if (!isempty(m)) {
l = strv_split_nulstr(m);
if (!l)
return log_oom_debug();
}
r = sd_json_variant_append_arraybo(
&aj,
JSON_BUILD_PAIR_ENUM("designator", partition_designator_to_string(d)),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_BOOLEAN("writable", pp->rw),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_BOOLEAN("growFileSystem", pp->growfs),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(pp->partno > 0, "partitionNumber", SD_JSON_BUILD_INTEGER(pp->partno)),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(pp->architecture > 0, "architecture", SD_JSON_BUILD_STRING(architecture_to_string(pp->architecture))),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(!sd_id128_is_null(pp->uuid), "partitionUuid", SD_JSON_BUILD_UUID(pp->uuid)),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("fileSystemType", dissected_partition_fstype(pp)),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(!!pp->label, "partitionLabel", SD_JSON_BUILD_STRING(pp->label)),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_UNSIGNED("size", pp->size),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_UNSIGNED("offset", pp->offset),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_INTEGER("mountFileDescriptor", fd_idx),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRV_NON_EMPTY("mountPoint", l));
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
loop_device_relinquish(loop);
return sd_varlink_replybo(
link,
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_VARIANT("partitions", aj),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_BOOLEAN("singleFileSystem", di->single_file_system),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("imagePolicy", ps),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_UNSIGNED("imageSize", di->image_size),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_UNSIGNED("sectorSize", di->sector_size),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING_NON_EMPTY("imageName", di->image_name),
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(!sd_id128_is_null(di->image_uuid), "imageUuid", SD_JSON_BUILD_UUID(di->image_uuid)));
}
typedef enum MountMapMode {
MOUNT_MAP_AUTO = 0, /* determine automatically from image and caller */
MOUNT_MAP_ROOT, /* map caller's UID to root in namespace (map 1 UID only) */
MOUNT_MAP_FOREIGN, /* map foreign UID range to base in namespace (map 64K) */
MOUNT_MAP_IDENTITY, /* apply identity mapping (map 64K) */
_MOUNT_MAP_MODE_MAX,
_MOUNT_MAP_MODE_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} MountMapMode;
static const char *const mount_map_mode_table[_MOUNT_MAP_MODE_MAX] = {
[MOUNT_MAP_AUTO] = "auto",
[MOUNT_MAP_ROOT] = "root",
[MOUNT_MAP_FOREIGN] = "foreign",
[MOUNT_MAP_IDENTITY] = "identity",
};
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(mount_map_mode, MountMapMode);
typedef struct MountDirectoryParameters {
MountMapMode mode;
unsigned directory_fd_idx;
unsigned userns_fd_idx;
int read_only;
} MountDirectoryParameters;
typedef enum DirectoryOwnership {
DIRECTORY_IS_ROOT_PEER_OWNED, /* This is returned if the directory is owned by the root user and the peer is root */
DIRECTORY_IS_ROOT_OWNED, /* This is returned if the directory is owned by the root user (and the peer user is not root) */
DIRECTORY_IS_PEER_OWNED, /* This is returned if the directory is owned by the peer user (who is not root) */
DIRECTORY_IS_FOREIGN_OWNED, /* This is returned if the directory is owned by the foreign UID range */
DIRECTORY_IS_OTHERWISE_OWNED, /* This is returned if the directory is owned by something else */
_DIRECTORY_OWNERSHIP_MAX,
_DIRECTORY_OWNERSHIP_ERRNO_MAX = -ERRNO_MAX, /* Guarantee the whole negative errno range fits */
} DirectoryOwnership;
static MountMapMode default_mount_map_mode(DirectoryOwnership ownership) {
/* Derives a suitable mapping mode from the ownership of the base tree */
switch (ownership) {
case DIRECTORY_IS_PEER_OWNED:
return MOUNT_MAP_ROOT; /* Map the peer's UID to root in the container */
case DIRECTORY_IS_FOREIGN_OWNED:
return MOUNT_MAP_FOREIGN; /* Map the foreign UID range to the container's UID range */
case DIRECTORY_IS_ROOT_PEER_OWNED:
case DIRECTORY_IS_ROOT_OWNED:
case DIRECTORY_IS_OTHERWISE_OWNED:
return MOUNT_MAP_IDENTITY; /* Don't map */
default:
return _MOUNT_MAP_MODE_INVALID;
}
}
static JSON_DISPATCH_ENUM_DEFINE(dispatch_mount_directory_mode, MountMapMode, mount_map_mode_from_string);
static DirectoryOwnership validate_directory_fd(
int fd,
const char *path, /* purely for logging purposes */
uid_t peer_uid,
uid_t *ret_current_owner_uid) {
int r, fl;
assert(fd >= 0);
assert(uid_is_valid(peer_uid));
assert(ret_current_owner_uid);
/* Checks if the specified directory fd looks sane. Returns a DirectoryOwnership that categorizes the
* ownership situation in comparison to the peer's UID.
*
* Note one key difference to image validation (as implemented above): for regular files if the
* client provided us with an open fd it implies the client has access, as well as what kind of
* access (i.e. ro or rw). But for directories this doesn't work the same way, as directories are
* always opened read-only only. Hence we use a different mechanism to validate access to them: we
* check if the directory is owned by the peer UID or by the foreign UID range (in the latter case
* one of the parent directories must be owned by the peer though). */
struct statx stx;
r = xstatx_full(fd,
/* path= */ NULL,
AT_EMPTY_PATH,
/* xstatx_flags= */ XSTATX_MNT_ID_BEST,
/* mandatory_mask= */ STATX_TYPE|STATX_UID|STATX_INO,
/* optional_mask= */ 0,
/* mandatory_attributes= */ STATX_ATTR_MOUNT_ROOT,
&stx);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to statx() directory fd: %m");
r = statx_verify_directory(&stx);
if (r < 0)
return r;
fl = fd_verify_safe_flags_full(fd, O_DIRECTORY|O_PATH);
if (fl < 0)
return log_debug_errno(fl, "Directory file descriptor has unsafe flags set: %m");
if (stx.stx_uid == 0) {
*ret_current_owner_uid = stx.stx_uid;
if (peer_uid == 0) {
log_debug("Directory file descriptor points to root owned directory (%s), who is also the peer.", strna(path));
return DIRECTORY_IS_ROOT_PEER_OWNED;
}
log_debug("Directory file descriptor points to root owned directory (%s).", strna(path));
return DIRECTORY_IS_ROOT_OWNED;
}
if (stx.stx_uid == peer_uid) {
log_debug("Directory file descriptor points to peer owned directory (%s).", strna(path));
*ret_current_owner_uid = stx.stx_uid;
return DIRECTORY_IS_PEER_OWNED;
}
/* For bind mounted directories we check if they are either owned by the client's UID, or by the
* foreign UID set, but in that case the parent directory must be owned by the client's UID, or some
* directory iteratively up the chain */
_cleanup_close_ int parent_fd = -EBADF;
unsigned n_level;
for (n_level = 0; n_level < 16; n_level++) {
/* Do not go above bind mounts */
if (FLAGS_SET(stx.stx_attributes, STATX_ATTR_MOUNT_ROOT)) {
log_debug("Directory is a mount point, not checking for parent's ownership.");
*ret_current_owner_uid = stx.stx_uid;
return DIRECTORY_IS_OTHERWISE_OWNED;
}
/* Stop iteration if we find a directory up the tree that is neither owned by the user, nor is from the foreign UID range */
if (!uid_is_foreign(stx.stx_uid) || !gid_is_foreign(stx.stx_gid)) {
log_debug("Directory file descriptor points to directory which itself or its parents is neither owned by foreign UID range nor by the user.");
*ret_current_owner_uid = stx.stx_uid;
return DIRECTORY_IS_OTHERWISE_OWNED;
}
/* If the peer is root, then it doesn't matter if we find a parent owned by root, let's shortcut things. */
if (peer_uid == 0) {
log_debug("Directory referenced by file descriptor is owned by foreign UID range, and peer is root.");
*ret_current_owner_uid = stx.stx_uid;
return DIRECTORY_IS_FOREIGN_OWNED;
}
/* Go one level up */
_cleanup_close_ int new_parent_fd = openat(fd, "..", O_DIRECTORY|O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC);
if (new_parent_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open parent directory of directory file descriptor: %m");
struct statx new_stx;
r = xstatx_full(new_parent_fd,
/* path= */ NULL,
AT_EMPTY_PATH,
/* xstatx_flags= */ XSTATX_MNT_ID_BEST,
/* mandatory_mask= */ STATX_UID|STATX_INO,
/* optional_mask= */ 0,
/* mandatory_attributes= */ STATX_ATTR_MOUNT_ROOT,
&new_stx);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to statx() parent directory of directory file descriptor: %m");
/* Safety check to see if we hit the root dir */
if (statx_inode_same(&stx, &new_stx)) {
log_debug("Directory file descriptor is owned by foreign UID range, but didn't find parent directory that is owned by peer among ancestors.");
*ret_current_owner_uid = stx.stx_uid;
return DIRECTORY_IS_OTHERWISE_OWNED;
}
r = statx_mount_same(&stx, &new_stx);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to compare mount IDs: %m");
if (!r) {
/* NB, this check is probably redundant, given we also check
* STATX_ATTR_MOUNT_ROOT. The only reason we have it here is to provide extra safety
* in case the mount tree is rearranged concurrently with our traversal, so that
* STATX_ATTR_MOUNT_ROOT might be out of date. */
log_debug("Won't cross mount boundaries, not checking for parent's ownership.");
*ret_current_owner_uid = stx.stx_uid;
return DIRECTORY_IS_OTHERWISE_OWNED;
}
if (new_stx.stx_uid == peer_uid) { /* Parent inode is owned by the peer. That's good! Everything's fine. */
log_debug("Directory file descriptor is owned by foreign UID range, and ancestor is owned by peer.");
*ret_current_owner_uid = stx.stx_uid;
return DIRECTORY_IS_FOREIGN_OWNED;
}
close_and_replace(parent_fd, new_parent_fd);
stx = new_stx;
}
log_debug("Failed to find peer owned parent directory after %u levels, refusing.", n_level);
*ret_current_owner_uid = stx.stx_uid;
return DIRECTORY_IS_OTHERWISE_OWNED;
}
static int open_tree_try_drop_idmap_harder(sd_varlink *link, int directory_fd, const char *directory_path) {
int r;
_cleanup_close_ int mount_fd = open_tree_try_drop_idmap(
directory_fd,
"",
OPEN_TREE_CLONE|OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC|AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW|AT_EMPTY_PATH);
if (mount_fd >= 0)
return TAKE_FD(mount_fd);
if (mount_fd != -EINVAL)
return log_debug_errno(mount_fd, "Failed to issue open_tree() of provided directory '%s': %m", strna(directory_path));
_cleanup_(pidref_done) PidRef pidref = PIDREF_NULL;
r = varlink_get_peer_pidref(link, &pidref);
if (r < 0)
return r;
_cleanup_close_ int mntns_fd = pidref_namespace_open_by_type(&pidref, NAMESPACE_MOUNT);
if (mntns_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(mntns_fd, "Failed to open mount namespace of peer: %m");
r = is_our_namespace(mntns_fd, NAMESPACE_MOUNT);
if (r < 0)